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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Property rights—for example, direct property rights under the international 
intellectual property rights protection system or contractual rights creating assets 
in the form of debts, including financial debts in the international financial and 
monetary system—can confer on the property holder or creditor powers which 
share the characteristics of sovereign powers in some measure.  Because property 
rights create social relations between people with respect resources—“things”—
and powers over these resources—where the person is exclusively entitled to the 
resource, perhaps not in law, but factually and politically—can turn into powers 
over people.  This conception shares features of sovereignty as understood in the 
early modern period.  The individual property owner is hardly relevant to this 
phenomenon; instead, the important players are the property owners of a bundle 
of all forms of property rights, including land, chattels, and intangible assets—
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such as financial assets—held world-wide:  typically, multinational corporations.  
Unlike modern liberal democracies where sovereign powers are ultimately vested 
in the people and delegated to representatives in an elected parliament, 
corporations, like banks or business entities in the manufacturing or service 
sector, lack the checks and balances that developed in states over the last three 
centuries.  The general meeting of shareholders of a public limited company is in 
no way comparable to a parliament.  The decision-making body for a private 
enterprise, with its limited interests and specialized scope of activity, was not 
designed for this role. 
One notices that this “corporate” sovereignty shares certain features coming 
out of the conceptual development of sovereignty in political philosophy in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  Thus, there is a partial return to the 
beginnings of this development.  While the modern theory of state sovereignty 
evolved in the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries—especially in 
Germany—it  has very little to contribute to the analysis of the present problem; 
instead, the property-oriented conception of state sovereignty of the seventeenth 
century more closely resembles the current phenomena.  The authors of the early 
modern period carved out and emphasized the distinction between property and 
sovereignty, but it was recognized that the conceptual similarity of both was still 
sufficiently close.  Only some critical authors, from the first third of the 
twentieth-century, have remarked that this bifurcation has never really operated in 
social reality. 
This article shows some of the ways in which certain entities—fundamentally 
private law in nature— have recently been empowered by states or the European 
Union (EU) to enjoy property and contractual rights to such an extent that they 
effectively obtain a certain quasi-sovereign status.  The article then examines the 
evolution of the concept of sovereignty and its connection with property in 
political philosophy and legal theory to obtain a theoretical basis for an analysis 
of present developments. 
The following discussion presupposes a certain meaning of the terms 
“property” and “sovereignty.”  For present purposes, it suffices to say that 
property rights confer exclusive rights in objects or “things,” whether tangible or 
intangible, such as a house, an apple, or an intellectual property.  A modern 
concept of property would detach the legal construct of “property” from any 
possible materiality of a thing:  the property right creates the property for the 
purpose of the law; the physicality, if any, of an object is only a social reifier that 
the property right represents.1  With this concept of dematerialized property one 
can explain phenomena of physical chattels, land, incorporeal objects, such as 
debts, money and intellectual property rights, even “investment” or goodwill 
which all have, at least economically, the status of property.  The property rights 
are enforceable against the whole world, erga omnes; everyone is bound to 
observe these rights.2  This is in contrast to contractual rights that bind only the 
parties privy to the contract or other personal rights arising from tort or other 
obligations.3  In this article “property” will be understood—consistent with the 
 
1 Andreas Rahmatian, Intellectual Property and the Concept of Dematerialized Property, in 6 
MODERN STUDIES IN PROPERTY LAW 361, 361–70 (Sue Bright ed., 2011). 
2 See MICHAEL BRIDGE, PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW 1–3 (4th ed. 2015) (for English law). 
3 Id; see also FRANZ BYDLINSKI, SYSTEM UND PRINZIPIEN DES PRIVATRECHTS 171–74 (1996) 
(generally and for the German legal family in particular); NADEGE REBOUL-MAUPIN, DROIT DES BIENS 
111–12 (3eme ed. 2010) (for French Law). 
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terminology of English law4—as comprising tangible, intangible, and pure 
intangible property—which includes debts, shares, other securities, and 
intellectual property rights.  The European Court of Human Rights interprets the 
term “property” in Art. 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention of 
Human Rights in a similar way.5 
Lawyers distinguish between two forms of sovereignty.  The first form is the 
sovereignty of the state internally, which is the supremacy of governmental 
institutions and subject to national public or constitutional law.  The second form 
is the sovereignty as the supremacy of the state as a legal person founded on the 
fact of territory within public international law.6  It will become apparent that this 
distinction is less relevant for the present problem than one might expect. 
 
 
I. EXERCISE OF POWERS RESEMBLING SOVEREIGN POWERS THROUGH PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: EXAMPLES OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCIAL LAW 
 
A. International Free Trade Agreements (TTIP, CETA) 
 
International trade rests increasingly on free trade agreements, being 
international treaties of commercial law.  One of these treaties is currently being 
negotiated between the United States (U.S.) and the EU, the Transatlantic and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP), although the recent election of Donald Trump as 
President of the U.S. may put an end to these negotiations.  TTIP assumes that 
“[t]he obligations of the Agreement shall be binding on all levels of 
government.”7  TTIP has been said to be not only about trade, but also about 
“generating regulatory coherence and breaking down barriers to transatlantic 
commerce” to generate growth and become a “second transatlantic anchor” 
alongside NATO.8  TTIP is also meant to be a challenge to the multi-lateral 
World Trade Organization (WTO) trade system in which, according to one 
commentator, a number of emerging economies do not want to open up to “open 
rules-based commerce”—that is, free trade and an unregulated market—and 
resort to national protectionist regulatory rules.9  Put differently, national 
economies of developing countries should no longer seek to protect their markets 
through domestic regulations against cheap—and often subsidized—western 
products—usually from the EU—that may destroy their domestic economy and 
contribute to the current European refugee crisis. 
The same objectives of efficient, high standard regulatory alignment and 
modernization apply to the system of Investor-State Dispute Settlements (ISDS) 
that TTIP will contain.10  The ISDS are a principal point of grave concern;11 
 
4 BRIDGE, supra note 2, at 13–19; J. E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 23 (1997). 
5 See e.g., CLARE OVEY & ROBIN C.A. WHITE, JACOBS & WHITE: THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 345 (4th ed. 2006). 
6 MALCOM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 487 (6th ed. 2008); see also GEORG JELLINEK, 
ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE 394, 406, 427, 435 (1900) (Sovereignty is a result of the state powers, being 
one of the constituting elements of the state as territory, people and state powers (Staatsgebiet, Staatsvolk, 
Staatsgewalt)). 
7 See Council Directives 11103/13, Negotiation on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
between the European Union and the United States of America, art. 4, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/ 
document/ST-11103-2013-DCL-1/en/pdf. 
8 Daniel S. Hamilton, Transatlantic Challenges: Ukraine, TTIP and the Struggle to be Strategic, 52 J. 
COMMON MKT. STUD. 25, 32 (2014). 
9 Id. at 34. 
10 Id.; see also Council Directives, supra note 7, at arts. 16, 23.  
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similar measures exist in numerous international investment agreements and trade 
agreements already in force, but are comparable to TTIP, such as in the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).12  The ISDS will be enforced 
through arbitration—that is, by private courts with judges selected by the parties 
to the arbitration with a procedure not open to the public or public scrutiny.13  
Here, a paradox of neo-liberalism becomes apparent:  while neo-liberalism, or, 
more precisely, market fundamentalism, relies heavily on law—for the 
functioning of investment protection, the markets and arbitration as the form of 
dispute settlement with awards enforced by state courts—it rejects or circumvents 
the state and its legislative and judicial organs—as the sources of law, being 
either statutes or court decisions.14  In the present context, the investment 
protection of foreign investors which ISDS guarantees in principle is to be seen as 
a property protection of foreign companies—“in principle” is a necessary 
qualification, because the arbitration scheme permits companies to raise 
investment protection claims, but there is no guarantee that the decision of the 
arbitral court will sustain such claims.  Public policy interests, especially about 
health, labor rights, and environmental protection,15 are increasingly taken into 
account—or so we are told.16 
While the negotiations for the TTIP agreement are currently ongoing—and 
have not generally been made public or followed the norm of transparency in 
other ways17—one can obtain good insight into the regulation of such a ISDS 
system by looking into the sister agreement between Canada and the EU, the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)18—since the 
negotiations have been completed.  This agreement has been signed and, in all 
likelihood, will enter into force.  Critics have said that the controversies and 
movements seeking to stop TTIP would then become less relevant because U.S. 
companies could pursue arbitration through their Canadian subsidiary companies.  
According to the consolidated CETA text, the investment—that is, property—
protection is wide, since the market access prohibitions are extensive19 and 
“investment” is defined very broadly.20  TTIP is likely to be very similar.21 
 
11 Mark Weaver, The Proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): ISDS 
Provisions, Reconciliation, and Future Trade Implications, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 225, 253 (2014–2015); 
George Monbiot, The TTIP Trade Deal Will Throw Equality Before the Law in the Corporate Bonfire, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 13, 2015, 3:46 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jan/13/ttip-trade-
deal-transatlantic-trade-investment-treaty (instructive summary of the popular reservations against TTIP). 
12 See generally North American Free Trade Agreement U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 
289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA] (National Treatment, Most Favoured Nation Treatment rules, and so on.); 
Weaver, supra note 11, at 233. 
13 NAFTA, supra note 12, at arts. 1115–20. 
14 COLIN CROUCH, THE STRANGE NON-DEATH OF NEOLIBERALISM 63 (2011); see also Council of the 
European Union, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Trade in Services, Investment and E-
Commerce, July 12–17, 2015, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/september/tradoc_153807.pdf. 
15 See Negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, INI 2014/2228 at 2(b)(vii) 
(2015). 
16 Roland Kläger, The Impact of the TTIP of Europe’s Investment Arbitration Architecture, 39 
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DEUTSCHES UND AMERIKANISCHES RECHT 68, 70 (2014). 
17 See Weaver, supra note 11, at 254, 258–59. 
18 Hamilton, supra note 8, at 34.  
19 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, EU-Can., art. 10.5, Aug. 5, 2014, http://trade.ec. 
europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf. 
20 Id. at art. 8.1.  “Every kind of asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has 
the characteristics of an investment, which includes a certain duration and other characteristics such as the 
commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk.”  This 
is followed by a non-exclusive list.  Id. 
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Even if arbitration tribunals are more considerate than the critics fear, the 
mechanism is necessarily property protection-friendly—whereby “property” is 
understood here in the widest possible sense as “assets” or, according to CETA, 
“investments” that even include mere chances and opportunities that may later 
translate into tangible property.22  Furthermore, while an investment protection 
claim is subjected to judicial scrutiny, the court is not a national and public court 
of law; nevertheless, it is empowered to make decisions of great importance for 
the public and national interest.23  Decisions may even lead to amendments to 
existing legislation in the health sector for example, or require changes to 
employment legislation—at the behest of a body that is not publicly accountable 
as an authority, ultimately before an elected parliament within the constitutional 
framework of a modern liberal democracy.  Thus, foreign companies can obtain 
protection for private property rights through the ISDS investment protection 
system that are potentially contrary to the policy decisions and legislative 
measures of elected governments.  This can amount to an encroachment on a 
state’s sovereignty24 and, in effect, a limitation of the freedom of a national 
parliament to pass laws.  The EU Commission has addressed some of these 
concerns when it embarked on a roadmap for further negotiation of TTIP; 
whether the concerns have been addressed adequately remains to be seen.25  The 
EU public consultation on ISDS produced mostly opposing replies, except from 
large corporations.26  The Investment Court system proposed by the EU 
Commission in November 2015, as an alternative to the original version of 
ISDS,27 changes little because it is not a real system of courts and not subject to 
review by the CJEU or other courts. 
 
B. International Property Rights: Intellectual Property 
 
However, one need not speculate about the outcome of ongoing negotiations 
of a comprehensive trade agreement with a diffusely contoured property 
protection regime.  One may rather look at an example of an already existing and 
implemented treaty in which straightforward property rights of foreign private 
entities obtain world-wide protection:  intellectual property rights in the 
 
21 According to a document leaked by Greenpeace in April 2016 on the negotiation regarding the 
liberalization of investment, definitions, market access, national treatment, performance requirements, the 
EU and the U.S. “have engaged in an in-depth comparison of their respective approaches, with a view to 
identifying areas that would require further substantive discussion in future rounds.  Work towards a 
consolidated text has progressed, notably on definitions, performance requirements and senior management 
and board of directors.”  Tactical State of Play of the TTIP Negotiations, at para. 1.3 (Mar. 2016) 
https://wikileaks.org/ttip/Tactical-State-of-Play/Tactical-State-of-Play.pdf. 
22 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, supra note 19, at art. 8.1. 
23 As to the question of publicity see id. at art. 13.20 (on choice and the list of arbitrators chosen on 
the basis of objectivity, reliability, and sound judgment, who are willing and able to serve as arbitrators 
with “specialised knowledge of international law”) and id at art. 14.10 (“Each Party shall make publicly 
available the final report of the panel after it is presented to the disputing Parties, subject to rule 40 
(confidentiality).”). 
24 In this context, sovereignty is understood as the internal sovereignty of a state with the supremacy 
of governmental institutions under national constitutional law. 
25 See Kläger, supra note 16, at 71–72. 
26 Commission Staff Working Report on Online Public Consultation on Investment Protection and 
Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
Agreement (TTIP), at 14 (Jan. 13, 2015). 
27 See Press Release, European Commission, EU Finalises Proposal for Investment Protection and 
Court System for TTIP (Nov. 12, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6059_en.htm. 
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Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).28  
This agreement imports many western standards of intellectual property 
protection;29 in fact, TRIPS started as an enforcement treaty to ensure the 
enforcement of western intellectual property rights in all parts of the world, 
especially in developing countries.  Hence, unique to international law treaties, 
TRIPS contains rather detailed commercial law provisions on the subsistence and 
principles of intellectual property rights to implement a minimum standard of 
intellectual property protection de lege ferenda and to enforce existing rights.30  
The idea of TRIPS was not only the enforcement of western intellectual property 
rights in the rest of the world, but also a development agenda;31 but how genuine 
this agenda was cannot be discussed here.32  In the years following the 
implementation of TRIPS, it emerged that some non-western countries were no 
longer mere recipients of intellectual property rights and know-how, but also 
significant producers—especially India, Brazil, and China33—which should have 
been a welcome development, whether or not this can be attributed to TRIPS.   
The U.S. and the European Union Member States, however, have tended to 
counteract this development by resorting to so-called “TRIPS-Plus” bilateral 
agreements.  These agreements between individual states bypass the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism applicable to TRIPS34 and are generally favorable 
to the more economically powerful party to the agreement—that is, the western 
party.  Even where TRIPS allows compulsory licensing and parallel importation35 
of patented products—for example, in the case of a health crisis—that does not 
mean the Western countries and their pharmaceutical companies will 
automatically acknowledge them.  The South African government, invoking this 
provision of TRIPS, faced aggressive litigation in 1998 which only came to an 
end in 2001—and informally, because of campaigns by NGOs.  From this 
experience, the right to take protective measures for public health were reasserted 
 
28 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994), https://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/trips_e/trips_e.htm [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
29 See Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third World: Intellectual Property 
Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework, 22 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 689 (1989); Peter 
Drahos, Negotiating Intellectual Property Rights: Between Coercion and Dialogue, in GLOBAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT 166–70 (Peter Drahos & 
Ruth Mayne eds., 2002); Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in the (Not-
So-Brave) New world Order of International Intellectual Property Protection, 6 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL 
STUD. 11, 15–28 (1998). 
30 TRIPS, supra note 28, at arts. 8–40 (provisions for a minimum standard for the laws of copyright, 
trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, layout designs of integrated circuits, and 
unfair competition). 
31 Id. 
32 For a discussion of the reality, see Samuel A. Oddi, TRIPS – Natural Rights and a “Polite Form of 
Economic Imperialism,” 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 415, 455–60 (1996); Andreas Rahmatian, Neo-
Colonial Aspects of Global Intellectual Property Protection, 12 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. L. 40, 42–45 
(2009); Alexander Peukert, Intellectual Property: The Global Spread of a Legal Concept, in 1 KRITIKA: 
ESSAYS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 114, 121 (Peter Drahos et al. eds., 2015) (with further references). 
33 Especially in the context of pharmaceuticals.  See MONIRUL AZAM, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 4 (2016). 
34 Peter Drahos, BITS and BIPS, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 791, 
805 (2001). 
35 TRIPS, supra note 28, at arts. 6, 31(b); Carlos M. Correa, Pro-competitive Measures under TRIPS 
to Promote Technology Diffusion in Developing Countries, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: 
KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 29, at 43, 48–50. 
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in the Doha Declaration in 2001,36 and the CETA Free Trade Agreement confirms 
the relevance of the Doha Declaration.37 
Intellectual property rights give far-reaching powers that go beyond the 
proprietary rights in relation to tangible property as a result of their conceptual 
and purely intangible nature.  Intellectual property rights are not confined to a 
geographic location but are abstract legal concepts that can exist worldwide.  
Certain international conventions have granted such expansive intellectual 
property rights,38 most recently TRIPS.  For example, a licensee of a computer 
program not only has to accept all restrictions the licensor—the software 
company or copyright holder—imposes, but it is also dependent on updates—
perhaps requiring further payment—and compatibility with other software.  The 
relationship is not a one-off sale but a continuous one, with the sustained power 
of the licensor to interfere with the licensee’s activities and business.  A seller of 
genetically modified crops can gain control over the buyer’s farming methods and 
choices on the basis of his patents, in relation to plant varieties, pesticides and so 
forth.39  Trademark owners have extensive powers of control over the sale, 
pricing, distribution of their products sold under the protected mark—even over 
the working conditions in the factories in which the products are produced.40 
 
C. The EU Financial Stability Mechanism 
 
Another intrusion on national sovereignty happened in Europe in the wake of 
the banking crisis in 2008 and 2009 and the measures by the European states—
under the auspices of the EU—to rescue the banking industry and, subsequently, 
the euro.  An analysis of the methods and legal measures for the complex rescue 
actions cannot be discussed here.41  From a property theorist’s perspective, one 
can summarize these measures as being designed to protect the property of the 
banks as creditors so as to avoid their failure and to prevent a systemic failure of 
the banking industry in general.  Apart from the emergency measures 
implemented to prevent the financial failure in Greece,42 the two particularly 
important means of EU financial intervention43 in the present context are the 
 
36 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc. 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 44 ILM 746 (2002); Willem Pretorius, TRIPS and Developing Countries: How Level 
is the Playing Field?, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 29, at 183, 188–94; CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, A COMMENTARY OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 80–81 (2007). 
37 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, supra note 19, at art. 20.3. 
38See generally World Intellectual Property Organization, Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property, March 20, 1883, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=288514;  World 
Intellectual Property Organization, Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
Sept. 9, 1886, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=283698. 
39 TRIPS has arguably facilitated this development.  See e.g., Martin Khor, Rethinking Intellectual 
Property Rights and TRIPS, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 29, at 207. 
40 See Rahmatian, supra note 32, at 56–70. 
41 See e.g., ALICIA HINAREJOS, THE EURO AREA CRISIS IN CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE, 15 (2015). 
42 It failed to fulfil all but one criteria to join the Eurozone in the first place.  See Sideek M. Seyad, A 
Legal Analysis of the European Financial Stability Mechanism, 26(9) J. INT’L. BANKING L. REG. 421, 422 
(2011). 
43 Other important means include the second revision of the Stability and Growth Pact (“six-pack”), 
consisting of five EU Regulations and one EU Directive—Regulations 1173/2011, 1174/2011, 1175/2011, 
1176/2011, Council Regulation 1177/2011, and Council Directive 2011/85;  the Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance, TSCG (Fiscal Compact), an intergovernmental treaty under international 
law between twenty-five EU Member States; and Regulations 472/2013 and 473/2013 (“two-pack”).  See 
Bruno De Witte, Euro Crisis Responses and the EU Legal Order: Increased Institutional Variation or 
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creation of the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism44 (EFSF) and, its 
successor, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)—as a permanent measure to 
enable financial assistance to EU Member States in financial difficulties.  The 
sources of law from which these measures emerged and the constitutional 
significance of the used methods of law-making have puzzled and concerned 
many EU constitutional and financial law scholars and specialists.45  In the 
European Law Review, Kenneth Armstrong detects that EU fiscal legislation is 
trending towards framework norms which blur the boundary between rule-
formation and rule-implementation, such that the norm production and norm 
compliance operate interdependently and the boundaries become ambiguous.46  In 
the words of traditional political theory, this represents a disintegration of the 
strict separation of legislative and executive powers—a typical feature of feudal 
and landownership-based political and constitutional regimes.  This is exactly 
what modern national constitutions abolished. 47  Some fiscal measures do not 
involve the legislature in form of a parliament—rather weak at EU level in any 
case—at all:  the Fiscal Compact48 entrusts the European Commission—not the 
European Parliament—with new, extensive instruments to direct the fiscal 
policies of the Member States49 that have the effect of limiting their national 
fiscal sovereignty.50  Ultimately this regulation confirms the prevalence of private 
property rights—in the form of investments—in the public law sphere. 
In addition to the measures and regulations, the basis of these measures, 
however, can also assume forms of private commercial law.  The EFSF was 
established as a limited liability company under Luxembourg law with its 
registered office in Luxembourg.  The company shareholders were the EU 
Member States in the Eurozone.  The EFSF is based on a framework agreement 
between the Eurozone Member States and the EFSF—as represented by the 
director51—and the construction of the company law confers the necessary legal 
personality to enable such an agreement.  It is obvious that the legal form of a 
company under the private law is not designed to—nor does it permit—a 
democratic participation or scrutiny in the way parliaments would under 
constitutional laws.  In fact, these devices are the result of accommodating certain 
obstacles in the EU treaties.  Some have assessed this course of action as the 
development of a new constitutional order in the EU in the form of an increased 
 
Constitutional Mutation?, 11 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 434, 438–40 (2015); Loreta Poro, Fiscal Union v. 
Individual National Sovereignty of EU Members States: A Conceptual Battle, 30(2) J. INT’L. BANKING L. 
REG. 68, 73–75 (2015); Kenneth A. Armstrong, The New Governance of EU Fiscal Discipline, 38 EUR. L. 
REV. 601, 601–04, 607–08 (2013). 
44 The EFSF is the result of the Decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the Euro Area 
countries of 10 May 2010.  It was initially envisaged as a temporary measure until 2013, but in fact lasted 
until September 2012.  See De Witte, supra note 43, at 438. 
45 Armstrong, supra note 43, at 605; Seyad, supra note 42, at 425, 428; Jonathan Tomkin, 
Contradiction, Circumvention and Conceptual Gymnastics: The Impact of the Adoption of the ESM Treaty 
on the State of European Democracy, 14 GERMAN L. J. 169, 170 (2013). 
46 Armstrong, supra note 43, at 605. 
47 This started prominently with the U.S. Constitution.  See U.S. CONST. art. 1–2 
48 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union art. 7, Feb. 
1, 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-12-2_en.htm [hereinafter TSCG]. This is an 
intergovernmental treaty between twenty-five EU Member States and is technically outside EU law. 
49 Id. at art. 3 ¶ 2. 
50 Poro, supra note 43, at 75; TSCG, supra note 48, at art. 3 ¶ 2 (provision formally preserving the 
national parliament’s powers by establishing that a fiscal correction mechanism to be proposed by the 
European Commission on the basis of common principles “shall fully respect the prerogatives of national 
Parliaments”). 
51 Seyad, supra note 42, at 425; Tomkin, supra note 45, at 170–71. 
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institutional variation.52  Others believe it is a measure to circumvent and violate 
EU constitutional law and to create a transnational executive system that escapes 
democratic accountability normally guaranteed by the rule of law.53  At least in 
relation to the foundation of the ESM, succeeding EFSF, the latter viewpoint 
must appear attractive. 
The provisional ESFS was established through a Council Regulation54 on the 
basis of Article 122 (2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU).55  This “solidarity clause” for Member States in need has, besides natural 
disasters, “exceptional occurrences” in mind, and a sympathetic interpretation 
might also include financial crises.56  The permanent stabilization mechanism of 
the ESM could obviously not rely on Article 122 (2), because the occurrence 
invoked would no longer be exceptional.57  The European Council then decided to 
amend the Lisbon Treaty by adding a new provision to paragraph 3 of Article 136 
TFEU58 under a simplified revision procedure.59  The reasons for this move were, 
among other things, to emphasize that no transfer of power from Member States 
to the EU was intended while also avoiding complications in the ratification 
process in the Member States,60 especially in form of a possible referendum.61  
More importantly, however, this amending procedure was chosen because the 
institution of the ESM was in conflict with the “no-bailout” provision of Article 
125 TFEU and a formally adequate reconciliation could have proved difficult.62  
The European Council decided to have the permanent financial rescue 
mechanism of the ESM established by an intergovernmental treaty under general 
international law that would be ratified by the EU Member States in the 
Eurozone—technically outside of EU law.63  The idea of this financial stability 
mechanism was to reduce systemic risks and to establish a restructuring or 
insolvency regime, especially for financial institutions with systemic relevance 
 
52 De Witte, supra note 43, at 451. 
53 Tomkin, supra note 45, at 188. 
54 Council Regulation (EU) 407/2010 of 11 May 2010, Establishing a European Financial 
Stabilisation Mechanism, 2010 O.J. (C 118) 1. 
55 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 122(2), Oct. 26, 
2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU] (“Where a Member State is in difficulties or is seriously 
threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its 
control, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may grant, under certain conditions, Union 
financial assistance to the Member State concerned.  The President of the Council shall inform the 
European Parliament of the decision taken.”). 
56 It is, however, not clear whether Article 122 (2) had economic “disasters” in mind.  See Tomkin, 
supra note 47, at 171. 
57 Seyad, supra note 42, at 428. 
58 European Council Decision of 25 March 2011 Amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union With Regard to a Stability Mechanism for Member States Whose 
Currency is the Euro art. 1, 2011 O.J. (L 91) 1 (“The Member States whose currency is the euro may 
establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as 
a whole.  The granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to 
strict conditionality.”) 
59 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 48, Oct. 26, 
2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 13 [hereinafter TEU]. 
60 See European Union Committee, Amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (2010–2011), https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldselect/ldeucom/110/ 
11005.htm. 
61 Seyad, supra note 42, at 427–28. 
62 Tomkin, supra note 45, at 171; TFEU, supra note 55.  Under the “no-bailout” provision, neither the 
EU nor its Member States become liable for other Member States.  Id. 
63 Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), Feb. 2, 2012, 2011 O.J. (L 91) 1. 
https://www.esm.europa.eu/sites/default/files/20150203_-_esm_treaty_-_en.pdf [hereinafter ESM Treaty]. 
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and, subsequently, the states.64  The EU could have pressed ahead with further 
formal economic-political integration—a politically unrealistic plan—or pursued 
an intergovernmental agreement formally less invasive of national sovereignty—
the approach that had been taken for the ESM.65  It is doubtful whether 
circumventing the decision-making powers of the European and national 
lawmakers while also introducing a regulatory regime that binds the individual 
states’ legislatures can really be seen as less invasive of national sovereignty.  It is 
true, with the route via an intergovernmental treaty, the European Council based 
the ESM on a different source of law outside EU law—preventing a formal 
conflict with Art. 125 TFEU.66  It, however, is problematic depending on whether 
or not the rule of law has been preserved adequately in this way. 
A challenge to the compatibility of this legal framework with EU 
constitutional law came before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Pringle v. 
Ireland and failed.67  The ECJ held that the ESM Treaty was compatible with the 
TFEU provisions relating to economic policy—especially with the “no bailout 
clause” of Art. 125 TFEU.68  The ECJ said that the ESM Treaty did not oppose 
the use of the EU institutions outside the EU legal framework provided that the 
institutions do not act in areas that fall under the exclusive competence of the 
Union and that the tasks entrusted to institutions do “not alter the essential 
character of the powers conferred on those institutions by the EU and TFEU 
Treaties.”69 
The ESM was presented in the litigation before the ECJ as an independent 
entity under international law, in that it was immune from prohibitions under EU 
law; at the same time, it was also presented as not an independent entity, in that 
the ECJ had jurisdiction to rule on disputes relating to the EU Treaties.70  Also, it 
was argued that the ESM was not concerned with monetary policy and was rather 
conceived to save the euro.71  One commentator noted that “there were 
compelling reasons to create the rescue funds EFSF and ESM outside the EU 
legal order, since the Union itself could not act . . . [and] , logically speaking, no 
erosion of the EU institutional balance has occurred.”72  Such a statement is, 
logically speaking, a petitio principii, and a judgment concerning the 
constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty from the German Constitutional Court can 
demonstrate that. 
The German Constitutional Court decided that the EU conforms to 
democratic principles.73  In its decision the court held that the Lisbon Treaty did 
not create a new state but preserved the European Union as the creation of 
sovereign democratic states, even though the EU itself has obtained legal 
 
64 Id. 
65 Christian Hofmann, Stabilizing the Financial Sector: EU Financial Services 2010-2012, 8(4) EUR. 
REV. CONT. L. 426, 431 (2012). 
66 Seyad, supra note 42, at 428. 
67 Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ireland, (Nov. 27, 2012) ¶ 147, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/ 
document.jsf?text=&docid=130381&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=
361447; see also Tomkin, supra note 47, at 181–85 (the author was a member of Mr. Pringle’s legal team). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at para. 158. See also Koen Lenaerts, EMU and the EU’s Constitutional Framework, 39(b) EUR. 
L. REV. 753, 756 (2014) (discussing Case C-370/12, Pringle). 
70 Tomkin, supra note 45, at 176. 
71 Id., at 187–88.  
72 De Witte, supra note 43, at 449.  
73 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BVE 2/08, Jun. 30, 2009 
(Ger.), https://www.bverfg.de/e/es20090630_2bve000208en.html. 
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personality.74  According to the court, for this level of integration, it was not 
required to democratically develop the system of the European institutions in a 
way that is analogous to a state.75  Hence, the European Parliament does not 
necessarily have the same competencies and powers of a national parliament in a 
democratic state.76  The German Constitutional Court also made it clear that the 
European Parliament was not a parliament comparable to the national parliaments 
of the Member States.77  Under this interpretation, since the EU was still an 
organization of independent sovereign states and could not act on its own, the 
national parliaments would be left with the authority over the ESM—therefore, 
the democratic principle is upheld by the national parliaments.  By creating the 
ESM, the EU institutions introduced a process for which they did not have the 
competencies or powers and thus largely bypassed the national legislatures, which 
would have had the respective competencies subject to their national 
constitutions. 
There are concerns not only about the method of establishing the ESM, but 
also about its framework that leads back to an increasingly established prevalence 
of international property rights beyond constitutional safeguards by sovereign 
states.  The ESM Treaty establishes the “international financial institution” 
ESM78 modeled upon the private law nature of a company limited by shares79—
with a legal personality,80 shares,81 dividends payable in principle,82 and a 
governance regime similar to that of companies.83  But, unlike a normal company, 
the governing members have complete immunity from liability for their actions. 
In the interest of the ESM, the Chairperson of the Board of Governors, 
Governors, alternate Governors, Directors, alternate Directors, as well as the 
Managing Director and other staff members shall be immune from legal 
proceedings with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity and 
shall enjoy inviolability in respect of their official papers and documents.84 
The Board of Governors, in connection with the interpretation and 
application of this Treaty, decides disputes arising between an ESM Member and 
 
74 Id. ¶ 278.  See also TEU, supra note 59, at art. 47. 
75 2 BVE 2/08 (¶ 278). 
76 Id. 
77 Id.¶ 280.  The German court stated, 
Measured against requirements in a constitutional state, even after the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the European Union lacks a political decision-making body created in equal elections by all 
citizens of the Union and with the ability to uniformly represent the will of the people.  In addition, 
connected with this is the lack of a system of organisation of political rule in which a European majority 
will carries the formation of the government sustained by free and equal electoral decisions and thus 
genuine competition, transparent for citizens, between government and opposition can come about. . . . 
[Th]e European Parliament is not a representative body of a sovereign European people.  This is reflected 
in its design as a representation of peoples in the respective national contingents of Members, not as a 
representation of Union citizens in unity without differentiation, according to the principle of electoral 
equality. 
Id. 
78 ESM Treaty, supra note 63, at art. 1(1). 
79 Id. at art. 8(5) (“The liability of each ESM Member shall be limited, in all circumstances, to its 
portion of the authorised capital stock at its issue price.  No ESM Member shall be liable, by reason of its 
membership, for obligations of the ESM.”). 
80 Id. at art. 32(2). 
81 Id. at art. 8(1) (authorised capital stock:  EUR 700,000 million, divided into seven million shares, 
having a nominal value of EUR 100,000 each, available for subscription); see also id. at art. 41 (payment of 
initial capital). 
82 Id. at art. 23. 
83 Id. at art. 4(1) (“Board of Governors and a Board of Directors, as well as a Managing Director and 
other dedicated staff as may be considered necessary.”); see also id. at arts. 5–7. 
84 Id. at art. 35(1). 
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the ESM or among ESM Members—including any dispute about the 
compatibility of the decisions adopted by the ESM with this Treaty.85  Ultimately, 
the ESM Member can seek a final appeal against the Governors’ decision to the 
CJEU.86  EU countries that have not adopted the euro are not members of the 
ESM and have no appeal to the ECJ under the ESM.87  Obviously then, states that 
are not a part of the EU are also not members of the ESM either, although they 
may be affected by measures of the ESM. 
It is understandable that there was not great interest of the EU institutions to 
involve the national parliaments of the Member States when drafting the ESM.  
Rather, the institutions would take the approach of letting the Member States 
effectuate the international treaty according to their respective constitutional 
procedures.  In this way, the ESM seems to outsource core activities of states’ 
fiscal sovereignty to a non-state private law entity in substance—and an 
institution under international law in form—to broadly safeguard property 
interests, particularly of banks of systemic importance.  The institutional structure 
of the ESM emulates company law that is not naturally equipped to provide the 
democratic scrutiny and transparency which public law generally guarantees for 
authorities and bodies established under constitutional law.  This complete 
immunity of the ESM organs for every activity has no counterpart in commercial 
law; indeed, company directors are responsible before the national courts.  It is 
also highly unusual in the context of international law.  Diplomats—arguably the 
closest equivalent to the members of the ESM governing bodies—do not enjoy 
immunity in their sending states. The receiving state can declare them as 
personae non gratae, and then no longer recognize the person as a diplomat after 
a reasonable period of time.88  An ESM board member can lose its immunity, but 
only if another member of the ESM board—that is, the governor or a director—
waives it with respect to that member.89  Apparently neither a national legislature 
nor an institution of the EU has the power to intervene in this process, and an 
ESM Member State which seeks the waiver of the immunity of an ESM organ 
against the ESM boards’ opinion will probably have to appeal to the CJEU90—
possibly even to just establish jurisdiction in the first place. 
It appears that decisions by the ESM could bind future national parliaments 
in relation to their political decisions on economic policy with a very limited 
recourse provided,91 in which case the sovereignty and powers of the legislatures 
may become restricted by a non-constitutional act or entity outside the state in 
question—and the national parliaments did not and do not have any influence in 
the making and the possible amendment of the ESM.  Similar problems can arise 
for fiscal measures based on the ESM.  This question, more precisely the 
suspension of voting rights of an ESM Member for non-compliance with the 
payment obligations of ESM members under the ESM,92 was raised in a 
 
85 Id. at art. 37(2). 
86 Id. at art. 37(3); see id. at recital 16 (The procedure is Art. 273 of the TFEU.). 
87 Cf. id. at recital 9, art. 5(4) (They have observer status in the meetings of the Board of Governors.). 
88 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961 art. 9, Apr. 24, 1964, http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/ 
instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf; SHAW, supra note 6, at 764–66; Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, 
VÖLKERRECHT 192–93 (9th ed. 1997). 
89 ESM Treaty, supra note 63, at art. 35(2)–(3). 
90 See id. at art. 37(3). 
91 Id.  The process to appeal to the CJEU under Art. 37(3) of the ESM Treaty, which may invite the 
court to make an economic policy decision that should be confined to the realm of politics where the 
decision makers are ultimately held to account by the electorate in general elections. 
92 Id. at arts. 4(9), 5–8. 
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constitutional challenge before the German Constitutional Court.93  At issue, 
among other things, was whether the suspension of the voting rights of Germany 
as an ESM Member—for example, because it disagrees with EU fiscal policy 
regarding payment duties, especially increase of payment obligations for further 
rescue measures, and so on—would restrict and violate the constitutionally 
guaranteed budgetary sovereignty of the German parliament.  The Court found 
that this was not the case.94  The Court said that “an upper limit for payment 
obligations and liability commitments following directly from the principle of 
democracy could at most be exceeded if the [parliament]’s budget autonomy were 
for at least a considerable period of time effectively non-existent.”95  The ESM 
Treaty does not oblige Germany, under international law, to agree to a capital 
increase.96  The Court probably thought, whether correct or not, that it painted an 
extreme scenario that could never occur in a way that an unconstitutional 
permanent constraint of democratic principles in fiscal planning can be ruled out.  
The Court stated that the ESM Treaty 
grants the bodies of the European Union no powers which affect the overall 
budgetary responsibility of the German [parliament] and does not force the 
Federal Republic of Germany to make a permanent commitment regarding its 
economic policy that can no longer be reversed . . . . [The ESM Treaty] does not 
grant the European Commission authority to impose specific substantive 
requirements for the structuring of the budgets . . . .97 
Unfortunately, the constitutional development of the EU is rather 
unpredictable. 
 
D. Outsourcing of Traditional Acts of State Sovereignty 
 
The pseudo-commercial law organization of the ESM has already pointed 
towards outsourcing traditional acts of state sovereignty.  Those activities that 
were traditionally understood as the exemplification of the core of state 
sovereignty—for example, warfare and related activities—has become 
increasingly common.  A notorious example in the U.S. was the controversy 
surrounding Halliburton.  Halliburton, the largest private oil and military services 
company in the U.S., obtained the contract to manage the logistical planning of 
the Iraq war in 2003 without competitive bidding.  The justification of this blatant 
creation of a monopoly position was that Halliburton constituted the only 
company sufficiently large to manage the task in question.  Halliburton, however, 
subsequently subcontracted with a number of other companies, creating a web of 
contractual relations which obscured specific obligations and accountability or 
liability.98  The ensuing scandal of mismanagement and overcharging would 
preoccupy the U.S. media and Congress for a long time to come.99  Relatedly, 
 
93 2 BvR 1390/12 (Ger.), http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/ 
2014/03/ rs20140318_2bvr139012en.html (joint proceedings of several complaints). 
94 Id. ¶¶ 183–245. 
95 Id. ¶ 184. 
96 Id. ¶¶ 184, 220; see also ESM Treaty, supra note 63, at art. 10(1). 
97 2 BvR 1390/12 (¶ 244.). 
98 Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatising Military Efforts Challenges Accountability, 
Professionalism, and Accountability, 46 B.C.L. REV. 989, 992–93 (2005); Charles Tiefer, The Iraq 
Debacle: The Rise and Fall of Procurement-Aided Unilateralism as a Paradigm of Foreign War, 29 U. PA. 
J. INT’L L., 1, 12–13, 19, 24–27 (2007); Arthur J. Jacobson, Outsourcing Incompetence: An Essay in Honor 
of Paul Verkuil, 32(6) CARDOZO L. REV., 2325, 2328–30 (2011). 
99 Minow, supra note 98, at 990; Tiefer, supra note 98, at 27–31. 
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after the invasion of Iraq, running the country’s economy was delegated to several 
large companies to be in charge of reconstruction, transportation, electricity, and 
so forth.100 
As a consequence of this type of arrangement, the government, as the 
representative organ of the executive, is not accountable because it is acting 
through private companies.  These companies, however, are only liable, in 
principle, under contract or commercial law and are free to organize their 
company structures and contractual relations—either to achieve favorable tax 
status or to obfuscate the chain of command so as to avoid possible civil and 
criminal liability.  Furthermore, within the construct of corporate mercenaries it 
becomes difficult to enforce human rights or international law of armed conflict.  
This prosecutorial deficiency is noteworthy because it is possible for contractual 
disputes to lead to military consequences.  For example, in Iraq, a dispute over 
payment for the security for military convoys between two subcontractors led to 
an under-equipped and under-prepared team of one of the subcontractors that 
subsequently led to the death of four employees—possibly killed by insurgents—
that would trigger the military invasion of Fallujah in April 2004.101 
Despite the far-reaching consequences of classical state actions traditionally 
derived from state sovereignty, the checks and balances that a government is 
subject to under a functioning democracy do not necessarily operate in such 
organizational designs with sufficient effect.102  The private property interests of 
companies and their shareholders will prevail over those of a state and its 
population in a way that the state effectively sanctions private contractual deals 
while also ensuring a lack of legal enforceability and allowing—or even 
encouraging—favoritism in public procurement.103  The state thus divests itself of 
any ability to control these interests or to hold the private actors accountable for 
their actions. 
 
E. Summary of the Examples 
 
What these examples have in common is that the agents—usually large and 
multinational business corporations and non-state agencies—have powers, 
potentially worldwide, through the exercise of their property rights, and these 
powers resemble exclusive and absolute powers normally associated with 
sovereign states.104  They, however, do not have the formal legal status of a 
sovereign subject under public international law, nor do they have the position of 
a sovereign under municipal public law.  These agents are legal—though 
artificial—persons formed under private and commercial law that have 
traditionally not been granted sovereign powers. 
In the first case, the international free trade agreements, such as CETA and 
the currently negotiated TTIP, are good indications that the future development of 
non-state sovereignty will be derived from—and invade—traditional state 
 
100 Bart S. Fisher, Investing in Iraq: Legal and Political Aspects, 18 TRANSNAT’L L., 71, 74 (2004). 
101 Jacobson, supra note 101, at 2329–30. 
102 Minow, supra note 101, at 1023.  
103 In Iraq, even foreign companies that were allies of the U.S., for example, Britain, were excluded.  
This was decided just before the invasion in Iraq in 2003.  Tiefer, supra note 98, at 36 n.172; see also 
Cathy Newman, Oil groups Eye Steak in Wake of Conflict, FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 12, 2003), 
http://libertyparkusafd.org/Hancock/primers/Oil%20Groups%20Eye%20Stake%20in%20Wake%20of%20
Conflict.htm. 
104 Daniel J. H. Greenwood, The Semi-Sovereign Corporation, in PROPERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY:  
LEGAL AND CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 267, 267–69 (James Smith ed., 2013). 
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sovereignty.  From this, a new relationship between public law and private 
property law emerges.  The ISDS has the potential to safeguard private 
investment interests against public interests without an analogous control that 
generally governs a state under a constitutional framework.  At the same time, 
however, the ISDS must rely on a state’s sovereign powers to enforce the arbitral 
awards that implement its property protection over “investments”—broadly 
defined and therefore causing inherent conflict with the state’s national 
sovereignty in other areas like economic and health policy.  The protection is 
enforced by international, yet still private, non-state judicial bodies.  As noted 
earlier, the classical distinction between internal state sovereignty and sovereignty 
of a state as a legal person within international law has become blurred and of less 
importance. 
The second case examines the international protection of intellectual property 
rights and the unique characteristics of these property rights.  As mentioned 
before, intellectual property rights are intangible and geographically 
unconnected—in contrast to land—with far-reaching powers and worldwide 
enforcement.  These unconstrained rights have to the potential to encroach on the 
sovereignty of individual states—especially in the developing world.  In this way, 
it becomes apparent that the non-state entity—for example, a multinational 
company—can exercise regionally quasi-sovereign power that restricts or 
partially replaces local state sovereignty. 
The third example—specific to the European Union—discusses the financial 
stability mechanisms for times of financial difficulty.  Through the establishment 
of the ESM as a principal device aimed towards EU financial stability, the 
Member States have created a non-state entity to direct their fiscal activities—
traditionally, a central area of authority for sovereign states.  The ESM, however, 
effectively falls outside the constitutional checks and balances of the Member 
States and the EU—for both its creation and operation.  The ESM’s 
organizational structure is modeled upon that of private companies, and the 
organs of the ESM are given unprecedented immunity.  The investment or 
property protection through the ESM is a combination of public and private 
interests—especially those interests of states and banks.  The property protection 
applies to specific branches of business—banks and financial services—and their 
respective influences on the financial position of states.  Under this “sovereign 
debt,” the protection and financial assistance bypasses the legislatures of the 
Member States as the central expression of their state sovereignty. 
The fourth case concerns the outsourcing of core activities in which state 
sovereignty normally manifests itself, such as warfare and associated logistics.  
Halliburton is a well-known example of a U.S. company active in such 
outsourcing.  In this case, quasi-sovereign powers were handed over to a non-
state entity that functioned as a mix of state sovereignty and sovereignty under 
international law. 
From the viewpoint of constitutional or international law theory, non-state 
entities in these four scenarios are not seen as enjoying the classical conception of 
sovereign powers; in fact, there does not seem to be a thorough academic 
examination of this situation at all.  There are some guidelines by the UN about 
the conduct of transnational corporations, but there is great uncertainty as to their 
legal effect;105 similar guidelines were issued by the Organization for Economic 
 
105 Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, 23 I.L.M. 626, 627 (1984); 
see also SHAW, supra note 6, at 250. 
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Co-operation and Development (OECD).106  But the legal reality cannot be 
ignored permanently, and legal doctrine ought to start critically analyzing these 
existing phenomena.  A study of the evolution of sovereignty as it emerges from 
reading the classical texts, as well as the role of property in this development, can 
give helpful insights. 
 
 
II. PROPERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
Political philosophy, legal theory, and legal history may be a starting point 
for trying to explain the phenomena of non-state powers with features of 
sovereignty and their relationship to property. The following discussion focuses 
more on internal state sovereignty. 
 
A. Bodin 
 
The modern idea of sovereignty, as an expression of uniform state power, 
appears in the sixteenth century as an attempt to reconcile the conflicting 
authorities among king, church, regional princes, and estates in medieval times.  
It was also a reaction to the wars of religion—against which a strong and 
undivided state power and pacifying force was supposed to be positioned.  The 
notion of sovereignty is generally attributed to Jean Bodin:  “A commonwealth 
(république) may be defined as the rightly ordered government of a number of 
families (ménages), and of those things which are their common concern, by a 
sovereign power.”107  This sovereignty is an absolute and perpetual power 
(majestas) vested in a commonwealth.108  The sovereign retains this absolute and 
perpetual power, even if he delegates it to an official—this delegated authority 
could expire or be revoked according to the sovereign’s will.  The power is 
absolute if someone has, or obtains, a perpetual power to dispose of property and 
persons, to govern the state as he thinks fit, and to order the succession liberally 
as any proprietor.109  This power is not a power delegated to him and thus he is 
not subject to any commands of another, but he himself can delegate the power.110  
The power is perpetual because it lasts for the lifetime of the person who 
exercises this power.111  If that sovereign is not a physical human being, but a 
magistrate—such as in the estates or a commonwealth of people112—it is 
perpetual in the same way that the states are.113  If the sovereign is a prince or 
king, then the people have renounced and alienated their sovereign power “in 
order to invest him with it and put him in possession,” and thus transfers all their 
powers and rights, “just as the man who gives to another possessory and 
proprietary rights” over his former property.114  How this sovereignty has been 
 
106 DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: THE 
GOVERNMENTS OF OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES, 75 U.S. DEPT. ST. BULL. 83 (1976), https://babel.hathitrus 
t.org/cgi/pt?id=osu.32437010892608;view=1up;seq=99. 
107 JEAN BODIN, SIX BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH 1 (M.J. Tooley trans., 1967). 
108 Id. at 25.  In Latin, this sovereignty is called majestas. 
109.Id. at 27. 
110 Id. at 28. 
111 Id. at 26. 
112 In French, this is “l’état aristocratique et populaire.” 
113 BODIN, supra note 107, at 27. 
114 Id. 
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acquired, whether by consent or by force, is irrelevant; the tyrant is sovereign, 
like the robber who is possessor:  “The robber’s possession by violence is true 
and natural possession although contrary to the law, for those who were formerly 
in possession have been disseized.”115  The relationship between sovereign—if it 
is a prince—and the person subjected to his authority is:  one is prince, the other 
subject; one is lord, the other servant; one is owner and holding sovereignty, the 
other is neither owner nor possessor.116  Law is the command of the sovereign in 
the exercise of his sovereign power.  The principal characteristic of sovereign 
power is that the sovereign can impose laws generally on all subjects regardless 
of their consent.117  The sovereign is not bound by other laws, such as the laws of 
his predecessors, or by his own laws:  the laws proceed from his free will; he is 
unable to bind himself, even if he wishes to do so.118 
Several points in Bodin’s argument are noteworthy.  Sovereignty differs from 
property, but property is an illustrative and instructive metaphor to explain the 
powers that sovereignty confers.  The property owner is a private “sovereign” in 
relation to his object of property.  The sovereign has imperium, similar to the 
owner who has dominium—with the former, the power is exercised over persons 
and through these things, while with the latter, power is exercised over things 
against persons.  Ultimately, this dominium is a power over persons.  Sovereignty 
does not distinguish between legal entitlement and factual power, because 
sovereignty is the source of positive law and legal entitlements.  Property law 
does distinguish between ownership as legal entitlement—the most extensive 
property right—which the robber has not, and factual possession which the robber 
also has.  The basis for this concept is, of course, Roman private law.119  
According to Bodin sovereignty is as alienable as a property right.  The property 
laws, as indeed all positive laws, are a result of sovereignty.120 
 
B. Hobbes 
 
In the Anglo-Saxon world the author who is associated most with the concept 
of sovereignty is Thomas Hobbes.  The sovereign in every commonwealth, 
whether monarch or “assembly of men,”121 is the absolute representative of all 
subjects with unlimited power; the concrete representatives in bodies politic have 
limited power prescribed and delineated by the sovereign.122  The sovereign is the 
legislator and is above all laws:  “For having power to make, and repeal laws, he 
may when he pleaseth, free himself from [the] subjection [to the civil laws], by 
repealing those laws that trouble him, and making of new.”123  The legislator is 
not the one who passes laws in the first place, but under whose authority the laws 
 
115 Id. 
116 See id. at 26–28. The original French passage says: “Car l’un est Prince, l’autre est sujet; l’un est 
seigneur, l’autre serviteur; l’un est propriétaire, et saisi de la souveraineté, l’autre n’est ni propriétaire, ni 
possesseur  . . . .” 
117 Id. at 32. 
118 Id. at 28. 
119 BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 107–09 (1962). 
120 However, even the princes are subject to divine and natural laws.  See BODIN, supra note 107, at 
29. 
121 Whether it is a democracy or the estates.  THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 132 (Michael Oakeshott 
ed., Collier Books 1974) (1651). 
122 Id. at 169. 
123 Id. at 199.  See also THOMAS HOBBES, ON THE CITIZEN 84 (Richard Tuck & Michael Silverthorne 
eds., Cambridge University Press 1998) (1642). 
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continue to remain in force.124  The right of the property owner is to exclude 
everyone from his property, except the sovereign; furthermore, the laws of 
contract, property transfer, and other dealings with property are determined by the 
sovereign.125 
Features of the idea of property also appear in Hobbes’s concept of 
sovereignty.  The owner’s dominium is subjected to the sovereign’s dominium.  
This must be so, because a person’s property right derives from the laws and 
power of the holder of sovereign power,126 and so it is the sovereign power which 
creates the owner’s power that property entails:  “But without such sovereign 
power, the right of men is not propriety [sic] to any thing, but a community; no 
better than to have no right at all. . . . Propriety therefore being derived from the 
sovereign power, is not to be pretended against the same.”127  Hobbes explains 
taxes as consideration for “that peace and defence [of the property rights] which 
the sovereignty maintains for them.”128 
 
C. Locke 
 
Locke qualifies the supreme position of the sovereign with regard to property 
in that, for him, the preservation of property is the purpose of government.  Hence 
“people should have property” which is a prerequisite for people joining 
society.129  Even the sovereign cannot take their property without their consent, 
otherwise “they have no Property at all.”130  The sovereign only has the power of 
passing laws, limited by reason, that regulate property, but there cannot be 
arbitrary power.  Therefore, taxes can only be levied with the consent of the 
people, because otherwise it would undermine their rights of property and the 
purpose of government to safeguard property.131 
 
D. The Peace Treaty of Westphalia 
 
The Peace of Westphalia of 1648132 was the first implementation of these 
modern concepts of sovereignty in international law and the first modern 
European arrangement of secular nation states with unrestricted sovereignty over 
given territories, and it is seen as the starting point for modern international 
law.133  The Peace of Westphalia does not talk of the concept of private property 
as such, since the provisions on restitution,134 acquisition,135 and restitution of 
 
124 HOBBES, supra note 123, at 199. 
125 Id. at 187. 
126 Hobbes, supra note 121. 
127 THOMAS HOBBES, ELEMENTS OF LAW 139–40 (Ferdinand Tonnies ed., Cambridge University 
Press 1984) (1640). 
128 Id. at 140.  
129 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 360 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
2008) (1689). 
130 Id. at 361. 
131 Id. at 362. This argument was essential in the American independence debate. 
132 Treaty of Peace Between Sweden and the Empire and Treaty of Peace between France and the 
Empire, Oct. 14, 1648, 1 Consol. T.S. 119, 119–356 [hereinafter Peace of Westphalia], English translation 
available at http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/87.%20PeaceWestphalia_en.pdf.  The Peace of 
Westphalia consists of two treaties, the Treaty of Münster between the Holy Roman Empire and France, 
and the Treaty of Osnabrück between the Holy Roman Empire and Sweden. 
133 SHAW, supra note 6, at 1282; see also Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948, 42 AM. J. 
INT. LAW 20, 26 (1948). 
134 See, e.g., Peace of Westphalia, supra note 132, at art. III § 1, art. V § 32. 
135 Referred to as “investitura.”  Id. at art. IV §§ 5, 9. 
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feudal rights, protection of emigrants’ property,136 presuppose the concept of 
property,137 but do not define or regulate it.  However, Article 8 § 1 on the 
constitutional position of the estates in the empire hints at property when it says: 
 In order to prevent all future disputes over the political order, each and every 
elector, prince, and estate of the [Holy] Roman Empire shall, by virtue of this 
treaty, be established and confirmed in their possession of all their ancient rights, 
prerogatives, liberties, privileges, the free exercise of their territorial rights, both 
spiritual and temporal (libero iuris territorialis tam in ecclesiasticis quam 
politicis exercitio), their seigneuries, and their regalian rights.  In the possession 
of all these things, they may not, by virtue of the present transaction, be molested 
at any time, in any manner, or under any pretext whatsoever. 138 
This legal recognition of the concept of uniform sovereignty of nation 
states139 also includes feudal privileges with a property element and outright 
private property rights.140  The concept of sovereignty of nation states in 
international law, the development of which began in part with the Peace of 
Westphalia, is dealt with in specialized works and need not be restated.141  
Specialized literature, however, does not concern the relationship of property to 
sovereignty.142 
 
 
III. PROPERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY IN LAW 
 
A. Early Modern Period 
 
Modern international law leaves the phenomenon of property to private 
law—and private law passes it on to legal theorists of property143—but, as we 
have seen, the sixteenth-century jurists who developed the contemporary concepts 
of sovereignty and the modern nation state still took account of property to a 
considerable extent.  In particular, they emphasized the distinction between 
sovereignty—imperium—and property—dominium—which mirrors the Roman 
law division of ius publicum144 and ius privatum.145. 
 
136 See id. at art. V §§ 27, 32, 36. 
137 In the respective provisions this could be private, feudal, or public property—or a blend of all three 
which was characteristic of late feudal societies. 
138 Peace of Westphalia, supra note 132, at art. VIII § 1. 
139 See DIETMAR WILLOWEIT, DEUTSCHE VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE, 6th ed., 150–51 (2009); see also 
Gross, supra note 133, at 31–34 (discussing the preparation of this concept of sovereignty by the jurists). 
140 Legal historians will stress the distinction between the sovereignty of state territories and a 
possible sovereignty of the estates themselves who were not intended to be sovereign in a modern sense as 
a result of the 1648 treaty.  MICHAEL KOTULLA, DEUTSCHE VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE: VOM ALTEN 
REICH BIS WEIMAR (1495–1934) 103 (2008). 
141 See, e.g., Vaughan Lowe, Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 334–60 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2006) (discussing prescriptive jurisdiction—principles of territoriality, national 
and protective principles—and enforcement jurisdiction). 
142 One particular exception is that state interference in private property law serves as a qualification 
for the principles of state territoriality and immunity—both features of state sovereignty.  For example, in 
relation to the enforcement of judgments against property in foreign states, or even (possibly non-immune) 
state property of foreign states, or the enforcement of state debts and the situation of state insolvency.  See 
Hazel Fox, International Law and Restrains on the Exercise of Jurisdiction by National Courts of States, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 144, at 379; see also Gerhard Kegel & Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, On the 
Territoriality Principle in Public International Law, 5 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 245, 253 (1982). 
143 See, e.g., PENNER, supra note 4. 
144 As matters of the Roman state.  See GAINES POST, STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL LEGAL THOUGHT: 
PUBLIC LAW AND THE STATE 337–38 (1964) 
145 As interests of individuals.  See id. See also ULPIAN, DIGEST, D 1,1,1,2. 
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Grotius, in his discussion of the original acquisition of property through 
occupancy of land, distinguishes carefully between “jurisdiction”—as an effect of 
sovereignty—and property— as a result of the occupancy of a specific piece of 
land.  He says that kings have power over everything in their own dominion, but 
every man has his distinct property.  Jurisdiction is exercised, first, in relation to 
persons, “and that alone is sometimes sufficient, as in an Army of Men, Women, 
and Children, that are going in quest of some new Plantations,” and, second, in 
relation to a place “called Territory.”146  Yet, although jurisdiction and property 
are usually acquired by one and the same act, they are distinct:  property may be 
transferred.  Indeed, it may be transferred not only to nationals, but also to 
foreigners, but the jurisdiction in relation to the property remains as it was 
before.147  Nevertheless, Grotius says in Mare Liberum that sovereignty is a 
special kind of proprietorship because it excludes ownership and possession by 
anyone else except the sovereign.148  So the idea of property lingers on, if only as 
a metaphor.  
Pufendorf follows Grotius’s distinction between sovereignty and property, at 
least implicitly, but Grotius is more to the point.149  Pufendorf, however, discusses 
a special issue where the different aspects of landholding qua sovereignty or qua 
proprietorship come to the fore:  in a monarchy, the question is whether or not the 
land of the realm is the patrimony—or property—of the king.  This can be the 
case in certain situations—“when later the ambition of rulers began to list among 
their chief possessions sovereignty over men”150—depending on the way in which 
the kingdom was acquired.  In such cases, kingdoms were included in the kings’ 
patrimony, “of the alienation of which at their pleasure rulers had received the 
power to dispose, because this was understood to be a part of the highest force of 
dominion”151 or, one may query, sovereignty.  If the case of a patrimonial 
kingdom is answered in the affirmative, the effect of 
this manner of holding sovereignty is seen clearest in the fact, that not only is 
the condition of subjects fixed at the will of kings [as sovereignty in the form of 
passing laws and jurisdiction], but also that a king can transfer his right over such 
a kingdom to whomsoever he pleases.152 
Pufendorf’s explanation indicates a certain critical distance to the solution, 
which is presented as something coming from the past.  But while the natural 
lawyers of the seventeenth century may have found it increasingly difficult to 
reconcile natural law principles with the idea that a kingdom could be the 
personal property of a king, we should not forget that in the colonial era of the 
nineteenth century, the Belgian Congo—the Congo Free State—was effectively 
the personal property of the Belgian king—legally it was more complicated.153 
 
146 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 457 (Richard Tuck ed., 2005) (1625). 
147 Id. at 456–57. 
148 HUGO GROTIUS, FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 22–23 (Ralph Van Deman Magoffin trans., Oxford Univ. 
Press 1916) (1609).  But Grotius stresses that the use of the word “sovereignty” for ownership is an 
obsolete terminology and meant in the past the privilege of lawfully using common property.  Id. 
149 SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO 555–57 (C.H. Oldfather & 
W.A. Oldfather trans., Oxford, Clarendon Press 1934) (1688).  The emphasis here is on the private law 
side, discussing the origin of dominium or proprietorship and ownership.  With regard to the sea, a clear 
distinction between sovereignty and property cannot be made out.  Id. at 560. 
150 Id. at 1081. 
151 Id. at 1080–81.  Pufendorf distinguishes between several forms of sovereignty a king may be able 
to exercise (temporary or perpetual, limited or unlimited sovereignty etc.) which is not relevant here. 
152 That is, property transfer as another aspect of sovereignty.  Id. 
153 ROBIN HALLETT, AFRICA SINCE 1875: A MODERN HISTORY 432–40 (1974).  The acquisition of the 
Congo was a combination of hundreds of treaties with local chiefs.  The Association Internationale du 
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Rousseau distinguishes between sovereignty and property,154 and he stresses 
that property can be alienated, while sovereignty—contrary to Bodin—cannot 
be.155  Montesquieu spells out the distinction more clearly:  the “political laws” by 
which men relinquished their natural independence give them liberty, while the 
“civil laws” by which men renounce the natural communality of goods, confer on 
them property.156  The classical bifurcation of public law, sovereignty, and private 
law, property, is also emphasized. 
The emphasis on a conceptual separation of property and sovereignty, from 
the late sixteenth century onwards, is an attempt at overcoming feudalism—where 
the public and private law aspects, especially in relation to feudal duties and 
landholding, are strongly intertwined.  This feudalism was also a basis for the 
mediatization of state powers via the feudal lords and the subordination of the 
king under the church, and the modern concept of sovereignty sought to eliminate 
both.157  The definition of “property,” in the sense of private law, also hails 
significantly from the seventeenth century natural law jurists, which always 
included reference to classical Roman law or its developed forms in the ius 
commune.  For Grotius, violation of property was a justification of war.  This 
angle allows him to launch into a discussion of the private law concept of 
property in a public law and international law context.  He offers the common 
narrative—which has become particularly well-known  because of Locke158—that 
God has given man things over which man has property in common, but when 
“labor and industry” emerged, communal property was no longer sustainable,159 
and men obtained property by appropriation—either expressly by agreement in 
the case of division, or tacitly in the case of seizure.  To Grotius, this was the 
beginning of private property.160  Grotius then proceeds to examine the rights 
arising from property—especially ownership.161 
Grotius further deals with the original acquisition of rights, not over things, 
but over people, such as the rights of parents over their children—which arise 
from “generation”—or the rights arising from marriage or other associations, such 
as people and an assembly or person governing them or an association of several 
states.  Grotius considers these rights over persons as arise from consent which 
itself is derived from the respective association or subjection.162  A parallel 
discussion can be found in Hobbes, with the specific rule for the family, “wherein 
the father or master of the family is sovereign of the same; and the rest (both 
 
Congo had the Belgian King as its only member and was recognised as possessing sovereign status, made 
territorial treaties with France and Portugal as rivalling colonial powers, included large territories acquired 
as domaine privé of the king, and companies whose profits went into the king’s private purse. 
154 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, 67–68 (Betty Radice & Robert Baldick eds., 
Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin Books 1968) (1762).  Rousseau’s very interesting polemic about first 
occupancy as property acquisition cannot be discussed here. 
155 Id. at 54, 69–70. 
156 1 MONTESQUIEU, DE L’ESPRIT DES LOIS 876 (1768) ("Comme les hommes ont renoncé à leur 
indépendance naturelle pour vivre sous des lois politiques, ils ont renoncé à la communauté naturelle des 
biens pour vivre sous des lois civiles. Ces premières lois leur acquièrent la liberté, les secondes, la 
propriété."). 
157 Hermann Heller, Die Souveränität: Ein Beitrag zur Theorie des Staats—und Verwaltungsrecht, in 
2 GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN: RECHT, STAAT, MACHT 35 (1971). 
158 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE 286–87 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1689). 
159 See also PUFENDORF, supra note 149, at 540, 550. 
160 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURI BELLI AC PACIS (THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE) BOOK II 420–27 
(Richard Tuck ed., 2005). 
161 Id. at 428, 454, 685. 
162 Id. at 508, 513, 545. 
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children and servants equally) subjects.”163  In Mare Liberum Grotius explains 
that no one is sovereign over a thing which he has never possessed—or which no 
one has ever held in his name—and, like in private law, only the delivery of 
property and subsequent possession confers sovereignty.164 
Pufendorf was important in the shaping of concepts of property, at least on 
the European continent, and he was influenced by Grotius and Blackstone’s 
discussion of property.165  Equally important was Pufendorf’s classical liberal 
statement that individual and private property, not communal property, safeguard 
peace in a society.166 
 
B. Twentieth Century 
 
Real advances in the theory of the state and sovereignty in legal scholarship 
in the twentieth century came from the German-speaking countries.  Although the 
German legal scholarship on the theory of the state and the law in the first third of 
the twentieth century was substantial and influential, it also lacked any significant 
treatment of the relationship between sovereignty and property.  The emphasis on 
conceptual separation—but at the same time proximity—in the discussion of 
property and sovereignty was characteristic only of the texts of the seventeenth 
century.  The leading legal scholars of the twentieth century in this area were 
Hans Kelsen, Hermann Heller, and Carl Schmitt.  These three very different 
scholars are, however, connected by a certain neo-Kantian perspective as a 
starting point.167 
Kelsen stresses that the state has a normative character, more precisely, it 
constitutes a normative legal order—state and legal order are identical.168  Only 
within this normative order is sovereignty conceivable.  Property is merely a set 
of norms emanating from the power of legislation that is innate to a state and its 
sovereignty.169  The state is a legal person,170 and, as a legal person, it holds 
property in form of the fisc.171 
Heller criticizes Kelsen’s strict separation between an idealist realm of 
“ought” and the reality of the “is,” which leads to the congruence of legal order 
and state but is artificial in the light of real states.  “Ought” and “is” are bridged 
by the legal ought as being understood as a human will. The act of will that passes 
law is a dialectic unity of will and ought.172  While Heller introduces a more 
sociological approach against the strict positivist position, as exemplified by 
Kelsen, he does not deal with the proprietary aspects of state sovereignty, either.  
 
163 HOBBES, supra note 127, at 135. 
164 GROTIUS, supra note 148, at 11. 
165 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, LAWS OF ENGLAND, 8–9 (Edward Christian ed., 1800). 
166 PUFENDORF, supra note 149, at 541. 
167 CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 4–7 (Jeffrey Seitzer ed., trans., Duke Univ. Press 
2008) (1928). 
168 HANS KELSEN, REINE RECHTSLEHRE 59 (Bonnie L. Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans., 1992); 
see also LESLIE GREEN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE 76 (1988) (discussing the idea of the state being 
the national legal order only). 
169 HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 189, 255 (Anders Wedberg trans., Harvard 
Univ. Press 1945). 
170 Id. at 97. 
171 Or “fiscus.”  Id. at 193. 
172 HERMANN HELLER, STAATSLEHRE 188–89 (1934). 
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Nor does Carl Schmitt, who has recently gained some importance in Anglo-
American academic discourse, irrespective of the limited value of his theories.173 
Schmitt, representative of a certain strongly conservative position and a 
sinister figure in legal history, was the leading jurist for the Third Reich and the 
most prominent apologist for its violations of the constitution until he became 
isolated beginning in 1937, apparently because even the Nazis found his 
unashamed opportunism too uncanny.174  Schmitt criticizes Kelsen for his abstract 
conception of state-law-sovereignty.  A valid norm as such cannot be 
“sovereign,” while a constitution can be, in that the state is treated as something 
genuinely imperative that corresponds to norms.  Sovereignty has existential 
superiority over the norm, hence a lawmaker can only establish, never violate 
norms.175  The fiction of legal positivism that conclusively embodies sovereignty 
in constitutional norms disregards the essential political decisions of the state in 
reality, and these can conflict with norms.  These “statutory ruptures” are 
characteristic even of the modern Rechtsstaat.176  It is the exception—
characterized by unlimited authority—being the emergency state, not the normal 
legal system, which determines who is sovereign, and the sovereign decides 
whether there is an emergency state and whether the constitution has to be 
suspended.177  This concept of the supremacy of political leadership over norms 
of a Rechtsstaat in a liberal understanding and the connection of sovereignty with 
the political—not the law—became a suitable vehicle for the justification of any 
kind of arbitrary political act after 1933.178  It cannot be expected that the liberal-
technical concept of property would play any role in these diffuse and strange 
romantic concepts. 
Neither the twentieth century liberal-democratic tradition—represented by 
Kelsen in its strictly positivist form and by Heller in a more sociologically 
informed version—nor the conservative tradition—very broadly understood, in 
the case of Schmitt—provides an explanation for the effect of property on 
sovereignty and the relationship between these two.  Property rights are just a 
subset of the legal system.  The legal system, in turn, is superordinate to 
sovereignty in Kelsen’s view and even absorbs sovereignty—and the state 
itself—or it is subordinate to sovereignty according to Schmitt.  This view is 
reinforced by the way public lawyers understand law given that legal theorists 
are, for the most part, public lawyers.  But this approach has become more and 
more outdated. 
 
173 Id. at 207 (discussing one of the essential features of Schmitt’s thinking in an apposite critique, 
“Schmitt’s friend-foe activism, which has been interpreted psychoanalytically not without good reason [or 
reference], is finally characteristic of any brawl, and, because of that, does never lead to a specific mark of 
the political but at best to the triviality that the whole life is a struggle”); see also ARTHUR JACOBSON & 
BERNHARD SCHLINK, WEIMAR: A JURISPRUDENCE OF CRISIS 249 (2000) (explaining that Hermann Heller 
was a great legal theorist of the Weimar Republic who had to flee from the Nazis in 1933 and died later that 
year, and this is why he is unknown in the English-speaking world). 
174 See JACOBSON, supra note 173, at 280.  One should not overemphasise Schmitt’s opportunism.  
Schmitt’s isolation was probably the result of a typical cabal of different wings—here, the SS—within the 
NSDAP fighting against each other for power.  Even a cursory study of Schmitt’s works would quickly 
reveal that he was essentially a thinker of fascism even before 1933 and after 1945—despite those theories 
reaching their apex between 1933 and 1936—and his catholic roots did not stand against that. 
175 SCHMITT, supra note 167, at 62–63, 154–55. 
176 Id.  
177 CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY 5, 7, 12, 15 (George Schwab trans., 1985) (“Sovereign is 
he who decides on the exception”). 
178 As demonstrated by Schmitt’s spectacular arguments justifying the political murders in the Night 
of the Long Knives in 1934.  See Carl Schmitt, Der Führer schützt das Recht, 39 DEUTSCHE JURISTEN-
ZEITUNG 947 (1934). 
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IV. FEUDAL EFFECTS OF PROPERTY 
 
A. A Wider Sociological Understanding of Feudalism 
 
In the first decades of the twentieth century, Hobhouse, Tawney, and Morris 
Cohen provided a different analysis of the prevalent liberal interpretation of the 
concept of property.  Hobhouse distinguished between property for use—as a 
power over things—and property for power—as a power relationship either 
between or over those people who have a duty of noninterference.179  Tawney 
elaborated on this definition by stressing the conceptual separation between 
ownership and work.180  Work would normally confer active ownership, and the 
corresponding property, such as food, stock-in-trade, tools, would therefore be a 
certain function or performance of a service.181  The large majority of property, 
however, is in passive ownership, which is not a means of work but an instrument 
for the acquisition of gain or exercise of power—divorced from responsibility.182  
This passive property for acquisition and exploitation of power—as opposed to 
active property—appears in the form of rights, such as royalties, ground-rents and 
especially company shares—and today one would add, financial instruments of 
all kinds, like derivatives—as a basis for a class of rentiers.183  Both active and 
passive property are, at least for the lawyer, property in equal measure, but 
passive property is so divorced from actual physical objects for use that they are 
closer to a form of currency.184  Different from property as a result of one’s labor, 
property for exploitation and power confers income upon its owners that is not 
derived from personal service.185  As a result, “property is not theft, but a good 
deal of theft becomes property.”186 
Morris Cohen directly addressed the problem that is discussed here:  property 
and sovereignty are, from a sociological and political perspective, by no means 
strictly separated.  The legal distinction between dominium—rule over things by 
the individual—and imperium—rule over all individuals by the prince and an 
expression of sovereignty—will undoubtedly become blurred if one considers that 
the essence of a private property right is the right to exclude, not only the right to 
use by the owner—ius utendi, fruendi, abutendi.  This right to exclude entails the 
obligation of others to obtain the owner’s consent for the use of the property, and 
this power to consent gives a limited power and control over the other person 
seeking consent.  Thus, for example, a landowner may obtain power over those 
who want to live on the land by obliging them to render services to him as a 
prerequisite for his consent, whether historically in a feudal setting or, as today, 
based on private law of contract and property.187  Similarly, the employer will 
have power over his employees to require a certain behavior as a condition for 
 
179 LEONARD T. HOBHOUSE, PROPERTY: ITS DUTIES AND RIGHTS 9–10 (MacMillan and Co., Ltd. 2d 
ed. 1915). 
180 R.H. TAWNEY, THE ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY 65–68 (1921). 
181 Id. at 78. 
182 Id. at 65–66. 
183 Id. at 77–78. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 80. 
187 ALAIN SUPIOT, HOMO JURIDICUS: ON THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL FUNCTION OF THE Law 86–100 
(2007). 
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employment or continuation of employment.  The employment relationship is 
theoretically based on a contract that was freely entered into, but typically the 
strong economic position of the employer tilts the bargaining power substantially 
in its favor.  Because the exercise of a property right confers power over people—
compelling them to behave in a certain way—Cohen maintains that property has 
the character of a sovereign power, so property is a form of sovereignty.188  
Cohen only mentions in passing the role of bankers and financiers and does not 
discuss the corporate powers of companies and their shareholders because of the 
passive property for acquisition and exploitation.189 
These more sociological interpretations of the powers of property highlight a 
phenomenon that is well-known from the era of feudalism, and Cohen himself 
points out that the feudal system did not separate dominium from imperium; its 
characteristic was the inseparable connection between land tenure and personal 
homage.190 
 
B. The Classical Historical Legal Concept of Feudalism 
 
While an outline of the feudal system that emphasizes its legal institutional 
elements may be an idealizing presentation of this system from the viewpoint of a 
social historian,191 it nevertheless serves well for the analysis of the concepts 
attempted here.192  The medieval idea of the state until about 1300 was that of a 
realm, eternal and unlimited in space:  a universal Christian imperium.  What 
constituted the state was initially a relationship between persons, but that 
developed into socio-political formations that increasingly contained a territorial 
element.  The rivalries between the secular rulers and the church in the investiture 
conquest in the eleventh and twelfth centuries paved the way for the modern 
nation state, because the state had to define itself against and resist the central 
ecclesiastical power or the potestas papae.193  Besides, the strongly personal 
element in the feudal bond became gradually eclipsed by the proprietary element, 
so the territorialization of the state was accompanied by a stronger propertization 
of the individual feudal relationship—although one was not connected to the 
other as such.  In fact, feudalism was an important force in the fragmentation of 
the state and in its division into smaller principalities as territorial states, 
particularly in Germany.194  The practical applications of the theories of 
sovereignty in the later Renaissance period, as discussed above, led to these 
smaller territories and legally independent principalities.  Initially, feudal 
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189 See TAWNEY, supra note 180, at 66. 
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relationships could be used as an argument to prove sovereignty in respect of a 
specific territory—even up to the present day, in rare cases.195 
The legal elements of the feudal relationship were somewhat simplified196:  
the personal element—the contract of commendation or vassalage that consisted 
of the act of homage that established the placing of the vassal’s person at the 
lord’s position—and the oath of fealty—with which the vassal undertook to be 
faithful to the lord.  In particular, the oath of fealty was seen as the source of the 
mutual obligations of lord and vassal—for example, the vassal’s military services, 
advice,197 and the lord’s duty to protect and to provide for the vassal.198  The 
property element—which only became especially dominant during the classical 
period of feudalism and onwards—was the fief or benefice:  a grant of land to the 
vassal to secure the vassal’s maintenance, having been the lord’s duty, and to 
enable the vassal to carry out the vassal’s services due to the lord.199  When the 
fief or proprietary element later came to the fore within the feudal bond, fiefs 
emerged which were not attached to services to the lord,200 or services for which 
the vassal was not granted land but obtained money with which the lord fulfilled 
his obligation to the vassal.201  This gave the feudal system a capitalist aspect.202  
In particular, the last two phenomena are important for an analysis of sociological 
effects of a personal dependence—“feudalism” in a wider sociological sense203—
because of a proprietary nexus and the permeation of state sovereignty with 
proprietary elements. 
 
 
V. COMBINING THE ELEMENTS: POWERS IMITATING SOVEREIGNTY WITH 
PROPERTY 
 
 
Property rights, and the contractual relations of private law—especially in the 
context of international commercial law—for preparing the attribution and 
transfer of property rights, are intermingled with state sovereignty and serve as a 
constitutive force in establishing sovereignty; both internally—within the state 
where it establishes as the supremacy of governmental institutions—and 
externally—in the realm of public international law where it serves as the 
supremacy of the state as a legal person founded on territory.204  International law 
is more open to a private law-based approach than municipal public law, since 
 
195 Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (France v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17), http://www.icj-
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France and the U.K.  The court said, however, that although the Kings of France had an original feudal title 
with respect to the Channel Islands, that title was found to have lapsed in the thirteenth century and cannot 
produce a legal effect today, so that the Court’s decision on sovereignty was based on more recent acts in 
relation to the exercise of jurisdiction and legislative enactments.). 
196 Historians will considerably qualify the somewhat ahistorical and typified presentation of feudal 
institutions here, which does not take account of significant regional differences—Italy, France, England, 
German States—either.  Relevant for the present discussion is, however, the conceptual model.  See 
PATZOLD, supra note 195, at 7–9. 
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198 F.L. GANSHOF, FEUDALISM 69–78, 83 (Philip Gierson trans., 1976). 
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202 MITTEIS, supra note 193, at 340–41. 
203 See SUPIOT, supra note 187, at 106–07 (as understood by Marc Bloch in the tradition of the 
polemic against feudalism by the French Enlightenment and French Revolution). 
204 SHAW, supra note 6, at 489. 
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typical institutions of international law emulate private law—for example, the 
contract law nature of treaties205 or the property law nature of state territory and 
its acquisition206—with its characteristic subjects of equal standing, the sovereign 
states, as opposed to the classical public law setting of hierarchy and 
subordination.  The Austrian economist F. A. Hayek, who trained as a lawyer like 
many other Austrian economists, noticed the attitude in public law as compared to 
private law: 
The belief in the pre-eminence of public law is a result of the fact that it has 
indeed been deliberately created for particular purposes by acts of will, while 
private law is the result of an evolutionary process and has never been invented or 
designed as a whole by anybody.207 
Public law passes, private law persists.208  It is therefore difficult for public 
lawyers and legal theorists to understand that matters traditionally reserved to 
projectable and alterable public law can be regulated with the means of generally 
persistent private law which does not have built-in checks and balances for public 
accountability and revision—such as separation of powers, parliamentary 
scrutiny, and constitutional courts. 
Legal theory has not realized that a new form of sovereignty is being created 
by a mixture of cooperation between states and corporations and outsourcing of 
activities commonly regarded as expressions of state sovereignty—for example, 
private prison services.  Nor have scholars realized that this new sovereignty is 
the result of detailed international agreements of a clearly private and commercial 
law nature, which organize matters of financial and fiscal sovereignty—for 
example, the ESM—or which guarantee worldwide property protection that may 
affect the way of peoples’ lives in certain regions—for example the TRIPS 
Agreement on intellectual property rights.  All that is underpinned, not by a 
traditional state bureaucracy, but by an ubiquitous managerialism:  it derives from 
management science developed for private enterprises and is applied throughout, 
not only in business corporations, but increasingly also in state institutions.209 
This is reminiscent of the critique of the Frankfurt School.  But Karl Jaspers 
already had described the dehumanizing and leveling reduction of the individual 
human being as elements in an “apparatus” for maintenance in society in which 
the individuals fulfill short-term oriented duties without a permanent aim or 
perspective—derived from the structure of an anonymous and scientifically 
optimized management organization that is found in enterprises and state 
institutions alike.210  For Jaspers, this apparatus confers the fiction of equality, but 
self-evaluation only exists through envious comparison with others.  Any effect 
of intellectual endeavor can only be achieved by advertisement.  Otherwise one 
cannot reach this unintellectual mass of people that represents “being” without 
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168–80. 
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“existence” and adopts superstition, not creed.211  Carl Schmitt observed that there 
is an “onslaught against the political”—the “political” being “the exacting moral 
decision”—and the “biased rule of politics” appears to become replaced by 
“unbiased economic management.”212  Political problems are supposed to be 
dissolved into organizational-technical and economic-sociological tasks; the 
modern state becomes a “huge industrial plant.”213 
Modern legal theory does not assist in an analysis of the modern relationship 
between property and sovereignty.  One must return to legal history, the feudal 
system, and classical political philosophy.  It seems that sovereignty has not 
disappeared, but adopts the early forms of the seventeenth century from which it 
emerged.  Bodin and Hobbes saw the property right or dominium emanating from 
the sovereign’s imperium, and that is the endpoint already for modern twentieth 
century constitutional theory about sovereignty:  property need not feature 
specifically—and indeed it does not—with thinkers such as Kelsen, Heller or 
Schmitt.  But the exclusivity of the rights of the owner—the classical ius utendi, 
fruendi, abutendi—have the quality of imperium in the realm of private law.  
Furthermore, the sovereign power can be delegated, for example to an authority 
or an official, and according to some—Bodin, not Rousseau—sovereignty can be 
alienated, like property.  Historically, the idea of sovereignty was modeled, to a 
large degree, on the familiar concept of property.  This could not be otherwise, 
because the feudal system Bodin and other Renaissance thinkers sought to 
overcome was the contemporary system they knew—although the prime of 
feudalism had long passed.  What remained was the proprietary aspect of 
feudalism, the beneficium, while the personal bond of vassalage had largely 
become an empty formality.  It was the time of early “capitalist” forms of fiefs 
which were not attached to personal services and fiefs de bourse.  Offices within 
the state were attached to fiefs and were obtained through purchase.214  While the 
early modern thinkers emphasized the separation between sovereignty and 
property to move the emerging modern nation state away from feudalism, 
property was nevertheless a source for the concept of the all-embracing and 
unfettered power that characterizes sovereignty.  Grotius clearly saw sovereignty 
as a special kind of proprietorship, not technically, but as to its effects, which 
emulate ownership.  Pufendorf shows that it could become difficult to disentangle 
the ownership of the sovereign—at the time typically the king—of his personal 
property from his possible ownership of the state territory, a problem that 
recurred with colonialism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.215 
As the sovereign nation states weaken, property returns as the amalgamating 
force that can transcend national borders in a globalized market.  “Property” is to 
be understood in the wide sense of “assets”, and it is the equivalent to the 
definitions of “investments” which are provided protection through mechanisms 
 
211 Id. at 31–38 (translation provided by the author). 
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in free trade agreements, such as CETA.  Thus “property” includes not only 
physical objects, but also contracts, that is:  debts—including money,216 company 
shares, monetary and financial investment products of any kind—as well as 
options and expectations and products in relation to the assumption of risk.  
“Property” in the present context also comprises property organized for holding, 
investment, and exploitation—for example, in the form of a company or other 
business organization.  Corporate law emphasizes the separate legal personality of 
the company as property owner—so that shareholders technically do not own the 
company—but the aspect and effects of sovereignty of the property-owning 
company do not go away.217  An agreement of a free trade treaty—such as 
NAFTA and the future CETA and TTIP, if implemented—is an expression of 
sovereignty of the negotiating states.  Once implemented, it is not merely a 
delegation of sovereignty to an international body or a network of contractual 
relations based on an international treaty—that is, contractual in nature—and 
securing property claims—through investment—but a partial alienation of 
sovereignty.  Property-created quasi-sovereign powers, however, remain 
dependent on the state, since property and contractual rights only exist because 
individual state powers enforce these rights—in courts, in enforcement 
procedures—as an application of the general sovereign powers that characterize 
states.  The private law of contract and property—property understood in a wide 
sense—is enforced and rendered effective by the sovereign powers of the states 
which acceded to the treaty:  the duties under the treaty cannot be annulled 
because the contract under private law keeps binding the states and their 
legislatures, and these can only act in conformity with the international treaty.  
One can agree with Hayek:  public law passes, private law persists.  
Theoretically, a contracting state can declare to be no longer bound by such a 
treaty or it may affect a material breach of the agreement and thus terminate, or 
have terminated, its membership under international law.218  Whether that is a 
realistic option from a political, economic, or military points of view, is a 
different matter.  The implementation of ISDS through arbitration is a 
privatization of parts of the judiciary which is traditionally another central part of 
a state’s sovereignty.  Here we even have parallels to historical feudalism, 
because in the feudal era the courts were in the jurisdiction of the feudal barons 
and the state’s—that is, the king’s—power was mediated through these local or 
personal courts.  Today there are no feudal barons, of course, they are replaced by 
a conglomerate of international companies and states—acting as private entities 
and not in the capacity as sovereign powers—and, as a very important difference 
to historical feudalism, disconnected from any specific territory or land. 
Where the content of the treaty is not a web of contractual relations which 
create, or protect proprietary interests, but outright property rights themselves, 
particularly those not attached to any physicality or geographic location and 
territoriality.  For example, with intellectual property rights—safeguarded by the 
TRIPS Agreement and other international conventions—one can make out the 
consequences of international property protection even more directly.  Both free 
trade agreements and intellectual property enforcement can have a profound 
influence on the political and economic situations of people and peoples.  
Decision-making does not necessarily require the participation of the national 
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legislatures of individual states in a way that could shape the political and 
economic future of the nation significantly—even if the people have voting rights 
in a general election to a parliament in a liberal democracy.  This is the 
sociologically-informed definition of the power of property with the 
characteristics of a sovereign power that Tawney and Morris Cohen described in 
the 1920s—although they spoke little about the corporate powers and the 
financial systems then. 
The corporate powers of companies, banks, and financial systems in general 
came to the center of attention with the bailout of the banks following the 
financial crisis in 2008.219  The financial stability mechanism that the EU 
developed as a consequence of the rescue actions for the banking industry is 
firmly based on a private law-commercial law framework.  The ESM and its 
predecessor, the EFSF, have been organized in the form of companies.  The EFSF 
organized as a national limited liability company under Luxembourg law.  The 
ESM is organized as a creature of a treaty of international law that emulates 
commercial companies, with independent legal personality, shares upon which 
dividends can be declared and a corporate governance system that resembles the 
two-tier system of governance of companies limited by shares in Germany.  The 
treaty establishing the ESM is an intergovernmental treaty, and although the EU 
acted as an agency for the negotiations bringing about this agreement, the treaty 
and the ESM are outside EU constitutional law.  Although the contracting parties 
are the EU Member States within the Eurozone, they are not parties by virtue of 
their status as EU Member States, but just as ordinary states under international 
law.  The EU Member States have effectively reduced—perpetually and 
irrevocably—the exercise of their sovereign powers by largely precluding any 
participation of their national parliaments in the making and amendment of the 
ESM or measures under it.  The EU itself has clearly ceded its supranational 
sovereignty—leaving aside whether that concept exists220—permanently in 
creating the ESM, and the grant of an extensive immunity to the organs of the 
ESM, which mirrors sovereign powers, further emphasizes that fact.  The fiscal 
powers that the ESM can wield on the basis of private-commercial organizational 
structures created under international law are profound,221 and unlike the EFSF, 
the ESM is theoretically perpetual.  
If the EU embarks on making it a more common practice to establish such 
international agencies, it could make itself redundant in the long run.  A possible 
disintegration of the EU may not necessarily be provoked by the refugee crisis, 
for example, but by the strengthening of the banks and the financial sector 
instead—by conferring quasi-sovereign powers through private law techniques.  
Then, the businesses of the financial sector no longer need the EU for their 
operations since the members states will become separate international entities—
either in the form of companies for the operational side or intergovernmental 
organizations for the regulatory side—with an arbitration system of civil 
procedure for dispute settlement and without interference from either the 
parliaments or courts of law of the nation states or the EU.  This is evidently the 
 
219 See The Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash Course, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-still-being-felt-five-
years-article. 
220 The quality of the sovereignty of the EU and its relationship to the sovereignty of the Member 
States is unclear and a complicated problem.  See DIETER GRIMM, SOVEREIGNTY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
44–48 (2015). 
221 See ESM Treaty, supra note 63, at arts. 5(6), 14–18.  
88 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. vol. 7:2 
creation of a conglomerate of sovereign bodies—ultimately based on contract and 
property law—that gradually replaces the sovereignty of nation states that, in 
their exercise of their own sovereign powers, helped initially to form these new 
sovereign bodies.  It is also a replacement of public, constitutional law by private, 
international commercial law.  Again, there is a certain reminiscence of 
feudalism.  A major difference is, however, that today the state cedes sovereignty 
through permanent delegation, so that business entities and international 
regulatory bodies and financial agencies—such as the IMF—obtain quasi-
sovereign power, like the historical estates and the church—in contrast to the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when the state took such powers from the 
estates and the church. 
Furthermore, today, this transferred sovereign power is shared with the 
powers of the state.  Whether the state has ultimate control and a right to retract, 
as true delegation of sovereignty would require, however, is doubtful.  Law-
making is still in the sole sovereign power of the state—although there is a 
proliferation of rules and regulations in the financial sector which do not derive 
from classical legislatures—so it still remains necessary for businesses to 
influence legislation through lobbying. 
This permanent transfer of sovereign powers, in part, is not confined to fiscal 
powers.  Core acts of sovereignty, such as warfare and its logistics, have been 
outsourced to private companies.  The case of Halliburton and its subcontractors 
in the U.S. in the Iraq war is but one prominent example.  Such evolutions 
commercialize the state in all its facets and ultimately promote the state’s 
redundancy.  
The intention of such methods of implementation is obviously to bypass 
pesky parliaments—and the voting public—and courts of law, which may block 
certain acts as violating constitutional rights and the rule of law.  The further 
effect is that parliamentary elections and any involvement of the general public in 
politics, legal reform, and constitutional development of a state can become less 
and less relevant.222  One could already notice these effects in the context of 
financial stability measures and sovereign debt.  The problem with imposing 
certain financial and economic austerity programs is that they are supposed to be 
accepted by future incoming governments, irrespective of their political 
orientation and of the economic theories they may wish to implement.  This was 
clearly demonstrated by the election in Greece in January 2015 and the 
referendum in July 2015.223  The insistence on the austerity measures by the EU—
led by Germany—against the professed conviction of the Greek ruling parties did 
little to advance the democratic reputation of the EU and its Member States.224  
The practical inability to depart from a given economic plan forces political 
parties of different political convictions to agree on broadly the same economic 
policy.  That, in turn, destroys political pluralism that is the essence of a liberal 
democracy.   
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Furthermore, it makes democratic elections increasingly redundant since one 
of the central elements of a national government is the ability to shape economic 
policy.  One can see an erosion of state sovereignty by economic “practical 
constraints” of the “laws of the market” and inherent necessities which are not 
subject to democratic scrutiny because a parliament—no matter how it may be 
composed after new elections—has to consider itself bound by these constraints.  
Where the envisaged economic measures are, in the exceptional case, put to a 
vote in a referendum, an undesired result can be disregarded or counteracted with 
political pressure on the government.  This happened in Greece where a 
referendum was planned for 2011-2012—the government under Papandreou—
and then abandoned under pressure.225  In July 2015—the government under 
Tsipras—a referendum was actually held that rejected the bailout plan.  Despite 
that, a bailout plan that even went beyond the bailout conditions put to vote in the 
referendum was implemented.226  The partial delegation of state sovereignty in 
the form of contract and property structures and commercial business 
organizations confers upon banks and businesses sufficient power to assert their 
interests—and economic theories advancing their interests—against parliaments 
and politics with noticeable success.  
The future could be a bleak one.  Large multinational corporations—
generally unconnected with a specific state or territory—may organize whole 
societies and communities through contractual agreements with other business 
entities—including states which are acting in ways that resemble businesses and 
not sovereign bodies.  Property rights are created, transferred and safeguarded.  
The exploitation of these rights, in effect, consists of activities that traditionally 
fell within the domain of politics and the exercise of sovereign state powers.  
Disputes among these corporate entities are settled by way of private courts 
through arbitration; the role of nation states being limited to ensuring the 
enforcement of arbitral awards at the local level.  Defense measures against 
attacks, real or claimed, on a company’s commercial interests can be approved 
informally by a government and subcontracted to a mercenary company 
specialized in warfare.  These days, cost-effective drone attacks against 
oppositional individuals and groups or parties in breach of contractual duties 
could be implemented everywhere in the world.  The parliaments are confined to 
legislation giving effect to the framework of international commercial contractual 
and property relations, for example, through suitable enforcement or employment 
laws.  This is backed by a management system which is supposedly well-suited 
for businesses and state authorities alike—politicians, senior company managers, 
civil servants, journalists, academics all become interchangeable managers.227  
Allegiances and dependencies are created through contractual and employment 
relationships, not too dissimilar to feudal times.228  But the symbol of allegiance is 
no longer the coat of arms of the lord or the flag of the state; instead, it is the 
trademark of one’s company.  Any important political discourse, vision, or 
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measure, is reduced to a business decision or a business plan.  The principal way 
of participating in such a business decision is in the shareholder’s meeting of a 
company—which presupposes ownership of voting shares and preferably a 
majority of shares at that.  This would be in a strange way the resurrection of the 
specter of the Prussian “three class” voting system,229 which disappeared in 
1918.230  This system would fit nicely within the trend towards privatization of 
the state—especially if the criterion of eligibility to vote were no longer taxes, but 
company shares.  Such a reform would presumably also invoke John Locke’s 
comments on taxation and representation as a justificatory authority. 
The future, however, need not develop in this way.  The start for reform is 
not initially legislative change, but the abandonment of the ubiquitous paradigm 
that law can be replaced by economics and management; that justice can be 
considered as a version of efficiency.  That would confine businesses to their 
proper role again as producers and providers of goods and services while 
encouraging the states to exercise their traditional sovereign powers—subject to 
the modern liberal democratic constraints of a system of checks and balances.  
Only when this guiding principle has been reestablished will legislative reform 
can be meaningful and effective. 
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230 Under this voting system, only male taxpayers—as property owners beyond a minimum 
threshold—could vote and there was no direct suffrage.  The voters in each district were divided into three 
classes according to the proportion of their tax payments, and each class accounted for a third of the 
electors who would vote the deputies.  The inequality of this system is well-illustrated, as in 1903 the first 
class represented 3.4%, the second 12.1% and the third over 84.5% of the electorate, and in 1893 even a 
chancellor and three ministers found themselves in the third and lowest class.  See HELLMUT V. GERLACH, 
DIE GESCHICHTE DES PREUSSISCHEN WAHLRECHTS 31–32 (1908). 
